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ESSAYS
AMERICAN CORPORATE COPYRIGHT:
A BRILLIANT, UNCOORDINATED PLAN
Pau/J. Heald*
At first glance, American copyright law and policy seem to be dictated entirely
by a monolithic block of corporate rightsholders. Over the last twenty years,
powerful interests including Disney, the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), Microsoft, and the American Motion Picture
Association (AMPA), have successfully lobbied Congress for copyright term
extensions, copyright restoration, software anticircumvention legislation,
protection against audio bootlegging, and a series of bilateral and international
agreements designed to increase protection for American copyright owners
overseas) Even the failure to protect databases in America, widely touted as a
victory for the public interest, has been driven by opposition from large corporate
database gatherers. Serious public debate over issues raised by corporate
influence on copyright policy is limited to academic conferences, Internet
bloggers, and the occasional letter to the editor. The Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act (CTEA), a piece of legislation that will cost consumers
untold billions over the next twenty years, encountered so little opposition that
it was passed by Congress with a voice vote.
2
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcrof?
suggests a nearly complete capitulation to copyright lobbyists, resulting in a
Copyright Act that resembles the Internal Revenue Code. Like American tax law,
copyright law might now be accurately characterized as a series of statutes with
no coherent underlying theory, a code that merely reflects which factions have
sufficient political power to obtain an exception or a subsidy. The absence of
internal coherence, however, does not render the American situation unworthy
of study. Important lessons, especially for non-industrialized "pirate" jurisdic-
* Allen Post Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304, 104A, 1101, 1201 (2000).
2 See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2828
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000)).
3 537 U.S. 186, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (2003).
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tions, can be uncovered with a little work. A quick look at Eldred reveals the
starkest example of corporate control over copyright policy.4 Yet one can also
find within the United States a hodge-podge of regulations, legislation, and judge-
made rules that relieve /ocalconsumers from the most onerous costs of the over-
protection of copyrights.' An examination of the entire situation in the United
States reveals a brilliant, but casually coordinated, dual treatment of copyright:
One set of rules for U.S. consumers, and a different set intended for the rest of
the world. The present strategy allows rightsholders to capture rents from abroad
while minimizing costs at home, but it also suggests counter-strategies for the
developing world.
The Supreme Court's treatment of CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcroftis a good place
to begin the story. In 1998, Congress unconditionally extended the term of
copyright protection for existing works for twenty additional years.6 Without the
extension, over the subsequent twenty years, every book, film, and musical
composition published between 1928 to 1948 would have fallen into the public
domain in the United States. In return for retaining this vast, twenty-year income
stream, copyright owners were asked to part with nothing; the grant was entirely
unconditional. A group of small publishers and a choir director (my wife)
brought suit, arguing that an unconditional extension of rights in existing works
was unconstitutional-
7
The most convincing argument that Congress lacked the power to grant such
an extension was based on the language of the intellectual property clause of the
Constitution, which reads: "The Congress shall have Power... to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'
Prior to Eldred, the Court had consistently viewed this language as authorizing
Congress to strike an economic bargain with authors on the public's behalf. For
example, it had stated, "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "'
Continental lawyers will recognize here the utilitarian rationale for copyright
protection that has long coexisted uneasily with moral rights theories and that has
' See id.
See infra notes 16-46 and accompanying text.
6 Copyright Term Extension Act, supra note 2, § 102.
See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325, 333 (1954).
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helped justify the exclusion of such rights in Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agree-
ment;
10
A utilitarian quid pro quo theory of copyright, where the state is authorized to
provide incentives for authors, rather than to make gifts to publishers, cannot
justify an unconditional extension of the copyright term in an existing work. One
cannot provide an incentive to create a work that already exists. However, if
CTEA were struck down, Mickey Mouse would now be in the public domain, so
the Court engaged in an astounding about face: "[Wle reject the proposition that
a quidpro quo requirement stops Congress from expanding copyright's term in a
manner that puts existing and future copyrights in parity."" The gift given by
Congress to Disney, and a host of other corporate owners, was affirmed by a 7-2
vote of the Court, sounding the death knell for the utilitarian theory of copyright
in the United States. 12  This development should not be missed by those
negotiating with the United States over issues as diverse as moral rights and rights
to geographical indications.
To those familiar with the role of the U.S. government in advocating the rights
of its copyright owners before the World Intellectual Property Organization, the
World Trade Organization, and in bilateral negotiations with trading partners
around the world, the success of the corporate copyright lobby before Congress
and the Supreme Court might come as no surprise. After all, corporate copyright
owners have been driving U.S. foreign policy for years. Observers should not
draw the conclusion, however, that Eldred evinces a commitment on the part of
the United States to extract maximum rents from its own consumers. To be sure,
CTEA imposes significant costs on local interests, but a wide variety of legal
safeguards-for the time being-continue to protect American consumers from
the full brunt of the copyright lobby's TRIPS Plus and Berne Plus worldwide
strategy. 3 In other words, although Eldred nicely exposes corporate influence
over copyright, one must look deeper at American law to appreciate the entire
U.S. situation.
Eldred notwithstanding, U.S. copyright law is riddled with exceptions that
dilute the local rights of copyright owners. 4 When these exceptions are viewed
" Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 9(1), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-
Result of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
1 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 217; see also id. at 216 ("We note, furthermore, that patents and copyrights
do not entail the same exchange, and that our reference to a quidpro quo typically appear in the patent
context.").
12 See id.
13 See TRIPS, supra note 10; Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
14 See infra notes 16-46 and accompanying text.
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together, it becomes easier to understand why American consumers have yet to
organize to defend their interests, and why they remain uninterested in the effects
of U.S. copyright policy abroad. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, public outrage over the behavior of prominent monopolists led to the
adoption of strong and effective competition laws and the establishment of
federal regulation of mergers and acquisitions." A parallel sense of public
rebellion against copyright monopolies has failed to emerge in twenty-first century
America. The following list of legal doctrines helps to explain why.
1. The Altai Test for Software Infringement. Strong protection for the ideas
expressed in computer programs would lead to significant anticompetitive effects.
For example, if the first publisher of a tax preparation program were allowed an
exclusive right to market a product with that function, it could charge a
significantly higher price than if it were faced with multiple competitors in the
field. After flirting with broad protection in the 1980's, the U.S. Courts of Appeal
have unanimously adopted some version of the test for software infringement
presented in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.6 The test famously
requires the jury to "dissect" the protected and allegedly infringing programs,
"filter out" a wide variety of unprotected features from the protected program,
and "compare" the allegedly infringing program with the "golden nugget" of
protected expression that remains after dissection and filtration. 7 The case
permits developers to assemble a competing software program by all but the most
blatantly duplicative means. Copyright law is such a poor means of stifling
competition in the United States that a recent survey by Ronald Mann reveals that
venture capitalists in the software industry do not rely on copyrights in making
investment decisions." Only a patent might signal a competitive edge. Strong
competition has kept software prices in the United States below the antagonism
level of most consumers. In fact, much important and useful software is available
for free, such as Internet browsers and digital photography software.
2. Treatment of Databases. In 1991, the Supreme Court declared that facts
contained in publicly available databases could be freely extracted and used, as
long as original aspects of the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the
borrowed-from work were not duplicated.' 9 This concept of "thin" protection
15 See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 730-740 (1914) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
16 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cit. 1992).
17 Id. at 706.
18 Ronald Mann, The Myth of the Software Patent Thicket: An Empirical Investigation of the
Relationship Between Intellectual Property and Innovation in Software Firms (Feb. 2004), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=510103.
19 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,348-49, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1276, 1279 (1991).
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for databases facilitated the Internet explosion throughout the 1990's. An hour
spent surfing on the Internet best illustrates the massive borrowing and reuse of
information encouraged by Feist. A brief peek at the travel and real estate markets
tells an especially vivid story. Competition is fierce in both fields, where multiple
web-sites, all deriving information from the same data sources, compete to offer
the best services to consumers.20 Comparative pricing web sites may provide an
even better example. Pay a visit to http://www.mysimon.com, enter a product
name or model (try Olympus "Camedia C-50" digital zoom camera), and the
Mysimon web crawler will extract prices and product information from multiple
databases and provide a long list of competing Internet sellers. Feist has helped
make the Internet a happy place for American consumers.
3. Contributoy Liabiliy Rules. The growth of the Internet has also been fueled
by the failure of U.S. courts to hold Internet service providers (ISPs) broadly
liable for infringement committed by their customers. American consumers use
America On-Line, Microsoft Network, or a variety of broadband service
providers to commit massive amounts of copyright infringement. Although the
Napsterdecision shows a judicial willingness to hold web sites contributorily liable
when they facilitate infringement through peer-to-peer file sharing or knowingly
make protected works available for download,21 web site operators can simply
move their servers outside the physical confines of the U.S. to escape liability.
The ongoing success of infringing web sites is assured by the virtual immunity of
ISPs that provide access services to their users. ISP immunity is further
complemented by rules protecting the anonymity of ISP customers. As one
district court recently held, Congress has not authorized federal courts to issue a
general subpoena allowing copyright owners to search through ISP records to
look for infringers. The Internet has grown in large part because its primary
architects have not had to worry about the uses to which it can be put. This is
not true in other jurisdictions-for example, Germany-where courts have been
willing to hold ISPs liable even when they do not knowingly facilitate infringe-
ment.
23
4. Competilion Law. Microsoft is still a force to be reckoned with, but the
decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp.24 exposed a multitude of the software
20 Compare, for example, http://www.expedia.com, http://www.travelocity.com, http://www.
hotels.com, and http://www.cheapflights.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).
21 SeeA & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729 (9th Cir.
2001).
22 See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1555
(D.D.C. 2003).
23 Patricia Jacobus,AOL Found Guily ofAllowingMusic Bootlegs, CNETNEws.coM, Apr. 12,2000,
at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-239175.html?legacy=Chet (last visited Apr. 7, 2005).
24 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cit. 2001).
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giant's anticompetitive practices and cowed its behavior in ways noticeable to
consumers. For example, the case revealed Windows 95 and Windows 98 were
deliberately programmed to give users problems when they chose Netscape as
their browser instead of Microsoft Internet Explorer.2 Dedicated Netscape users
know that newer versions of Windows no longer cause their computers to crash
when they use their browser of choice. The full effects of the litigation are not
clear, and Microsoft still has a huge share of the market for operating systems in
the United States, but it has slowed Microsoft's most aggressive attempts to
expand its monopoly at the expense of American consumers. One proposed
remedy, the forced revelation of the Windows source code, may have had a
singularly salutary effect. Finally, American consumers remain content with
Microsoft for a reason wholly unrelated to legal doctrine. The Microsoft
Windows operating system is bundled with the purchase of new personal
computers, so consumers do not see how much they pay for the software.
At this point, it is worth noting that the first four doctrines mentioned above
have significant positive spillover effects internationally. Foreign consumers, as
well as Americans, benefit from competition within the American software
market and their visits to American web sites. They probably even benefit from
the extra-territorial reach of U.S. competition law, insofar as it protects U.S. firms
competing with Microsoft overseas. Other doctrines discussed below have
significantly fewer spillover effects internationally.
5. Exhaustion and Sham Licenses. Large American software producers would
like to stop the resale of their products. They do not want competition
developing in the form of a secondary market for software. Section 109 of the
Copyright Act, however, provides that the first sale of a copyrighted work
produced in the United States exhausts the rights of the seller as to the particular
copy sold.26 If Intuit sells a copy of TurboTax for $29.95, then the buyer has the
right to use it to do his taxes and then resell it to a friend for $9.95, even if it costs
Intuit a subsequent full-priced sale. For this reason, Intuit does not purport to
sell copies of the software. The shrinkwrap packaging around the CD-ROM
states that the payment of $29.95 merely buys a license to use the CD-ROM,
subject to various restrictions, including a prohibition on reselling the CD-ROM.
As long as the terms are visible, the act of opening the shrinkwrap purports to
bind the buyer to the terms of a license.
American courts, however, have been quite aggressive in policing the terms of
these so-called "licenses." Borrowing from a long line of cases that distinguish
between sham leases and authentic leases in the personal property context,2 the
25 Id. at 47.
26 17 U.S.C. 109 (2000).
27 See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(37) (2000).
[Vol. 12:489
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"sham license" doctrine as applied to software contracts directs courts to examine
the economic realities of a given transaction to reveal whether it is, in essence, a
true license or a sale. The labels used by the parties are irrelevant, and many
courts have found that "licenses" to transferees of software are really sales.2 8
Because they bear all the attributes of a sale (such as one-time purchase price
encompassing the full value of the good, most subsequent risk of loss born by the
buyer, no continuing monitoring of the good by the seller), they are treated as
sales for the purposes of exhaustion doctrine.29 Therefore, resale in violation of
the terms of the sham license is permitted. Although very few consumers are
aware of the sham license doctrine, they experience its monetary benefits
whenever they buy used or unbundled software.
6. Sovereign Immunity. According to the Supreme Court in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondagy Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, Congress lacks the
power to make states liable for copyright infringement.3" Since states have
historically not been substantial infringers, this may seem like a minor develop-
ment. The case, however, has a real impact at public educational institutions.
Many professors require their students to purchase customized "course packs"
of photocopied materials rather than multiple textbooks for a class. For example,
because no publisher sells a good textbook for my course on Law and Literature,
I have developed a set of photocopied materials that draw from a wide variety of
sources. Before Florida Prepaid, I obtained permissions for longer excerpts, but
now the university copy center will assemble the course packs with no questions
asked. The cost to my students is now one-third the amount they used to pay for
the same materials. Empirical data on photocopying practices of teachers at
public elementary, secondary and post-secondary institutions is lacking, as is data
on the awareness of sovereign immunity. It may be that Florida Prepaid merely
blessed an expansive view of fair use or a state of blissful ignorance which already
existed, but there is little doubt that public school coffers are fatter now than they
would be in a world of effective copyright protection.
7. Fair Use. Even in the absence of a doctrine of sovereign immunity, one can
make a strong argument that the photocopying done to assemble an educational
course pack is a privileged fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act.
31
Although the course pack issue is far from settled, the fact that such a practice is
theoretically defensible illustrates the breadth of the fair use exception. In the
United States, an amorphous four-part test permits a wide variety of unauthorized
copying. Whether copying is fair will be determined in light of: The purpose and
' See, e.g., Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
21 Id. at 1085.
30 527 U.S. 627, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (1999).
31 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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character of the use (considering whether the use is transformational or
nontransformational, or whether the use is noncommercial or commercial); the
nature of the copyrighted work (whether the work is fact-intensive or creative);
the amount used; and the effect of the copying on the potential market for the
work.32 For example, under the fair use doctrine, the slavish copying of computer
object code is permissible when the purpose is to discover interoperability
protocols or to extract unprotected elements of the program.33 Used in this way,
the fair use doctrine can enhance competition and lower prices. As used by
consumers, it is a convenient rationalization for necessary, everyday uses of
protected materials. For example, my wife photocopies music for her choir that
has been ordered, but is late in arriving. Every jurisdiction has some form of a
fair use doctrine, but the American version is famously broad, certainly much
broader than what is mandated by the Berne Convention.34
8. Photocopy Machines in Libraries. Unlike other jurisdictions that tax library
photocopy machines, or copies made on them, in order to compensate copyright
owners,3" U.S. law renders photocopying inexpensive and easy by providing
immunity to libraries that post a written warning over their machines.
36
9. Taxaion of Blank Media and Internet Commerce. With the exception of
obsolete digital taping technology, the United States does not tax blank media or
copying equipment in order to compensate copyright owners for lost revenue.
In addition, Congress has extended its moratorium on the taxation of Internet
commerce. 31 Compared to other jurisdictions with aggressive taxation schemes,
Congress is effectively subsidizing the transfer of goods that can be copied or
delivered electronically. Copyright law has not stood in the way of legal policies
designed to keep access to goods and delivery inexpensive for consumers.
10. Treatment ofLegalMaterials. Cases, statutes, and regulations promulgated at
all governmental levels are unprotected by copyright law.38 Access to them is
cheap and easy.39
32 id
" Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (9th Cir.
1992).
' Cf 17 U.S.C. § 107; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra
note 13, art. 10.
31 See Eugen Ulmer & Hans Hugo von Rauscher, Germany (Federal Reoubc), in INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 422-23 (Stephen M. Stewart & Hamish Sandison eds.,
2d ed. 1989).
36 17 U.S.C. § 108(o (2000).
37 Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 12 Stat. 2681-719 (1998).
38 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
31 See, e.g., FindLaw.com, at http://www.fmdlaw.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2005).
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11. The FirstAmendment. The Constitution lurks in the background of several
U.S. copyright doctrines-including the fair use doctrine. It was unsuccessfully
invoked in Eldred, but it provides significant consumer benefits in areas other than
copyright term extension. For example, copyright law excepts performances of
copyrighted works during religious services.' Churches need not pay for the right
to sing or play copyrighted works. Although seemingly a minor exception, a
contrary rule enforcing copyrights in this context in the United States would be
very controversial. More importantly, the First Amendment provides strong
protection for parody. In a recent high profile case, an appellate court upheld the
right of an author to publish a full length version of Gone With the Wind 1 from the
perspective of a slave in Scarlett O'Hara's household.4' The book, entided The
Wind Done Gone,43 represents the sort of critical expression that American
consumers expect to be able to enjoy. In particular, parody is a popular art form
on television and in film. Strong protection of copyrights in the parody context
would be sure to raise strong public protest. Americans are mostly willing to
respect copyrights and pay the full price for the entertainment they enjoy. They
are certainly willing to tolerate laws that discourage the pirating of music, books,
and films, but they would be utterly unwilling to suffer a law that denied an author
or artist the right to borrow heavily from a copyrighted work in order to make fun
of it.
12. Home-Sole Music System Exception. Not only is parody a staple of American
culture, but the right to hear background music in bars, restaurants, and shops is
apparently so fundamental that Congress has been unwilling to amend Section
110(5) of the Copyright Act' to conform with its obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement. In the United States, businesses that play broadcast music over
"home-style" stereo systems are exempt from paying royalties to the owners of
the music or the recordings.45 When the European Union complained on behalf
of rights organizations representing uncompensated copyright owners, the World
Trade Organization ruled that the Section 110(5) exemption was not in
compliance with TRIPS.46 Rather than ask Congress to amend U.S. law to
remove the exception, the U.S. government has agreed to pay compensation on
40 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2000).
41 MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (MacMillian 1936).
42 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (11th
Cir. 2001).
43 ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (Houghton Mifflin 2001).
4 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000).
45 Id.
46 Report of the Panel, United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. CopynghtAc, WT/DS160/R Gune
15, 2000).
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behalf of U.S. businesses in order to keep radios playing freely for American
consumers.
Conclusion. Although CTEA, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and U.S.
foreign policy all evidence the strong influence of corporate America, the many
exceptions listed above seem to indicate that its control over the law is far less
than complete. Before concluding that the United States has struck some sort of
harmonious balance of public and private interests, two facts must be noted.
First, most of the exceptions serve powerful business interests in the United
States. The Altai test, for example, is endorsed by many computer software firms
as mirroring an accepted culture of borrowing within the industry. The failure to
protect databases has been driven in significant part by influential database firms
in the United States. The lack of contributory liability is applauded by the U.S.
telecommunications industry. Every software and hardware firm, except
Microsoft, thinks ratcheting up antitrust scrutiny is a good idea. The Internet
commerce tax moratorium and the home-style music system exception are both
backed by large and well financed business coalitions. Despite apparent broad
exceptions, the shape of copyright protection seems to be driven primarily by
corporate interests, albeit of a diffuse and uncoordinated nature.
Second, even the exceptions that some large businesses do not like-sovereign
immunity for state governments, exhaustion rules and, to a certain extent, fair
use-help keep the sleeping giant of the American public quiescent and
unconcerned about overreaching copyright owners. As long as copyright law
does not weigh too heavily on the average American, an anticorporate backlash
like that seen in the antitrust era will not repeat itself. More importantly,
Americans will remain blissfully unconcerned about overreaching by corporate
copyright owners overseas as the brilliant, organic strategy of American copyright
law slowly unfolds.
Finally, at least two important lessons can be learned by the rest of the world,
in particular by the non-industrialized "pirate" jurisdictions that have drawn so
much attention from copyright owners and, therefore, the U.S. government.
First, the list of exceptions above shows that creative tools of resistance are
available. The list, and other exceptions too numerous to detail, provide a
blueprint for lowering the cost of copyright law to local consumers.4" To the
extent that a nation resents having to amend its law to comply with TRIPS and
the Berne Convention, it should consider the permissive options illustrated by the
internal American approach.
A final important lesson springs from the insight that all works protected by
copyright are not created equal. A nonindustrialized country has a much greater
41 See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and Aymmety in the
TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249 (2003).
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need to access computer software and textbooks than the latest Hollywood
thriller or MTV hit. Pirate jurisdictions, therefore, should seriously consider
bargaining for concessions in the software market by promising strict and
effective enforcement of foreign copyrights in music, film, and video games.
Such a bargaining strategy might have multiple benefits. Currently, in many
countries, unauthorized copies of American music and films sell for the same rock
bottom price as those produced by local artists. As long as pirate copies of
American works are plentiful and cheap, local artists cannot price compete. But,
if only authentic American CDs and DVDs can be sold, then their prices will
increase significantly, driven by scarcity and the desire of their owners to
maximize profits. Only when American and other foreign works are strongly
protected can local musicians and film makers price compete and develop their
markets. It is no coincidence that the Indian film industry, Malian musicians, and
Lebanese dress designers are pushing for stronger protection of copyrights in
their countries. Similarly, it is clear that allowing copyright piracy fuels American
cultural imperialism. As long as cheap pirate copies of American cultural
products are available, they will be consumed in massive quantities. The
consequence of increased protection for American owners will be what the
monopolist always demands, decreased supply and higher prices. In other words,
copyright law should be recognized as a powerful tool to resist American culture.
Given the internal benefits of increasing protection for foreign cultural works,
delivering such protection in return for concessions concerning software and
textbooks seems a promising negotiating strategy.
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